



The President's Daily Brief

4 December 1973



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 December 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Seoul is pressing for an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission which it wants to use as a forum for warning Pyongyang not to push its claim to waters surrounding islands south of the Northern Limit Line. [redacted]

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A narrow majority of UN members appears to support Prince Sihanouk's challenge to unseat the Lon Nol government at the UN. (Page 5)

In South Vietnam, President Thieu is working on long-range plans to strengthen his domestic position and permit him to run for a third term. (Page 6)

China [redacted]

Pakistan [redacted]

(Page 7)

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Tito's swing toward Moscow has been chiefly motivated by the desire to insure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. (Page 8)

Notes on continuing demonstrations in Korea [redacted]

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[redacted] appear on Page 9.

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At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the outcome of the recent Tito-Brezhnev talks at Kiev, and the effects of the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship on Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and other Communist countries, the third world, and the West.

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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL

Israel and Egypt appear to be edging toward an agreement to resume disengagement talks at Kilometer 101. An Egyptian Government spokesman said yesterday that indirect diplomatic contacts between Egypt and Israel are under way and that results can be expected "perhaps in the immediate future." Cairo still insists that before it will agree to resume talks Tel Aviv must indicate a willingness to change its "intransigent" bargaining position on troop pull-backs.


Israeli Defense Minister Dayan told UN Emergency Force Commander Siilasvuo Sunday [redacted]

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[redacted] that Israel's chief negotiator, General Yariv, would "certainly" be able to resume the talks and would be prepared to propose steps to effect a disengagement of forces. Dayan warned, however, that a discussion of a return to the October 22 lines was "out of the question" and that issues such as the re-opening of the Suez Canal were best left to a peace conference.

Lower level contacts between Israeli and Egyptian military commanders are continuing. Local commanders along the front are keeping in touch and have held meetings at Kilometer 101 to discuss such matters as transfer of supplies to Suez city.

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On the Egyptian front, flight activity yesterday returned to a high level. More than 50 Israeli aircraft flew routine missions while some 15 Egyptian aircraft carried out what were probably defensive patrols and at least one reconnaissance flight.

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[REDACTED] On the ground several exchanges of small arms fire were reported. A high-level UN official stated yesterday that the Israelis have completed an earthen causeway across the Suez Canal and are using it.

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For the second consecutive day, relatively heavy exchanges of fire occurred on the Syrian front. The Syrians apparently reacted again to Israeli construction activity near the cease-fire lines with small arms, anti-tank, and artillery fire. Damascus claimed 15 Israeli casualties; the Israelis admitted four.

Some influential Israelis may be arguing for a more flexible position regarding a possible US security guarantee for Israel as part of a Middle East peace package. An Israeli journalist known in the past to have reflected Dayan's thinking published an article on December 2 that called for a fresh look at the idea and additional discussions with the US. Another Israeli journalist, who probably reflects the views of more hard-line groups, stated in an article of November 30 that the Israeli Defense Force must find a new deterrent formula to impress upon the Arabs the hopelessness of future military action. He said Israel must develop a doctrine employing technological sophistication and daring tactics that would utilize Israel's new weapons systems and the superior quality of its manpower.

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
LIBYA-EGYPT

Tripoli has not officially announced the closing late last week of its diplomatic office in Cairo, an act which appears to be symbolic rather than a true diplomatic break. Libya's resident minister and staff officers are still in Cairo as is its permanent representative to the Arab League.

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
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KOREA

Seoul is pressing for an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, which the South Koreans want to use as a forum for warning Pyongyang not to push its claim to waters surrounding islands south of the Northern Limit Line. North Korea claims that these waters--and therefore presumably the islands--are within its 12-mile limit. Seoul is concerned that, unless Pyongyang receives clear notice of the South Korean position, an incident could occur during South Korea's support trips to the islands during the next few days. By seeking to use the Military Armistice Commission, Seoul is, in effect, also signaling that it opposes direct discussions of the issue with the North.

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a naval incident could occur which Pyongyang conceivably could use as an excuse for an amphibious assault on one or more of the islands.

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UN-CAMBODIA

The General Assembly today takes up Prince Sihanouk's challenge to unseat the Lon Nol government at the UN. Sihanouk's prospects have been improved by strong Chinese and nonaligned support; the most recent estimates show that a narrow majority--all that is needed on this issue--supports a resolution to seat Sihanouk's representatives. Approval of the resolution would be an important psychological victory for the Khmer Communists and a major accomplishment for the nonaligned states that have adopted the issue as a test of their solidarity.

The Asian Working Group, a caucus of UN members opposing the Sihanouk challenge, hopes to defer a vote until next year--a tactic that has been used successfully on similar issues in the past. This year, however, Sihanouk's supporters seem determined to mount strong opposition to postponement, and observers are predicting a close vote. [REDACTED]

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SOUTH VIETNAM


President Thieu is working on long-range plans to strengthen his domestic position. He is determined to have South Vietnam's constitution amended to permit him to run for a third term in 1975. He also wants to limit the independence of the judiciary through an amendment that would make Supreme Court justices presidential appointees and eliminate the legislature's role in their selection. The Ministry of Justice would be given more direct control over judicial activities in the provinces.

Thieu is satisfied with his recent efforts to weaken non-Communist opposition groups. He wants, however, to preserve at least one "opposition" party mainly for "appearances abroad" and, in recent months, has shown concern that his actions might influence the US Congress to cut aid to South Vietnam. Currently only the government's Democracy Party has full legal standing. Thieu and his advisers are considering ways to allow the two main opposition parties to achieve this status but, at the same time, strictly limit their freedom of action. If he is not able to work out a satisfactory system of control, he may consider forming a puppet party.

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PAKISTAN-CHINA



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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR

If any single factor has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make non-alignment a viable world force. He currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West.

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At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the outcome of the talks at Kiev, and the effects of the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship on Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and other Communist countries, the third world, and the West.

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NOTES

South Korea: The ouster of South Korean CIA chief Yi Hu-rak in yesterday's cabinet reshuffle has not stopped campus unrest. Seven hundred students from a major women's college staged a street demonstration in the center of Seoul today--the first major off-campus protest in the two months of disturbances. The government's response remains measured

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***YUGOSLAV - SOVIET RELATIONS**

Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union are now closer than at any time since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The gradual warming trend that began in 1971 suddenly went into high gear during the Middle East war and culminated in the exceptionally friendly talks between Tito and Brezhnev in Kiev in mid-November.

At the beginning of the 1970s Belgrade's foreign policy was still deeply influenced by what happened to Prague in 1968 and by attendant fears of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow and its loyal East European allies had gone sour and Belgrade's fervor for nonalignment had waned. In the communist movement, the Yugoslav party was cultivating its ties with China and Romania, who were prominent in their defiance of the CPSU. Relations with Western Europe and the US on the other hand, had prospered, both in reaction to the Soviet threat and in the hope that ties to the West would bring economic improvements at home.

By 1971, however, Tito had come to perceive that there could be serious drawbacks in leaning too far to the West. Premature attempts to establish democratic institutions precipitated a crisis of nationalism in Croatia. Economic ties to the West created large debts to Western creditors without ensuring adequate development of the Yugoslav industrial base.

Moreover, the strategic advantages of the Westward tilt began to erode as the mood of European politics shifted toward detente. As Brezhnev increasingly touted his friendly ties with the rest of Europe and the United States, Tito saw less reason to maintain his anti-Soviet line. Washington's role as the supporter of Yugoslav security began to fade. More important, perhaps, the new atmosphere gave Tito an opportunity to repair an old breach with the Kremlin in time to win Moscow's good graces for his successors. His meeting with Brezhnev in Belgrade in September 1971 set in train a series of political contacts and expanding economic ties that have become the core of the new relationship.


The Middle East war in October provided the final push toward Kiev. Tito immediately proclaimed full support for the Arabs--his principal partners in nonalignment--placing Yugoslavia squarely on the Soviet side in a major international crisis. Belgrade granted over-flight rights for the Soviet airlift, and the regime's presses began to crank out anti-Israeli propaganda.

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What Tito Received at Kiev

After issuing the warmly worded communiqué at the end of the visit, Yugoslav and Soviet officials have maintained a discreet silence about Kiev.

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In the realm of political cooperation, however, Belgrade has decided to back away from its long-standing support of China out of deference to the

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Kremlin's sensitivities. The Yugoslavs may also begin to mute their differences with the Soviets on international issues, such as MBFR, in which Belgrade has an interest but no real influence.

From Belgrade's point of view, the prospects of long-term economic cooperation were probably the most important matter discussed. Moscow had extended a \$540-million credit to Belgrade in 1972, and this October promised to build a gas pipeline to northern Yugoslavia. The Kiev discussions indicate, at a minimum, the Kremlin's continuing willingness to make solid investments in Yugoslavia.

The Soviets will probably make good on whatever economic promises Brezhnev made to Tito. They know that as long as the money pours in, Tito will not risk siding against the Kremlin on any of the more important international issues.

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There is also good reason to believe that Tito requested [redacted] modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces with Soviet weapons. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Soviet arms shipments to Yugoslavia would go far toward allaying any residual fears Tito may have of a Soviet invasion. For his own part, Tito may well have decided to seek arms in the only market open to him.

Effects of Kiev

Belgrade must be prepared to pay some penalties for whatever it stands to gain from the new relationship with Moscow. This changed attitude toward the

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Soviet Union will generally be detrimental to Yugoslavia's traditional role in the world communist movement and in the international community.

The most immediate effect, and perhaps one of the most telling, will be a downturn in relations with Romania. President Ceausescu, who has long regarded Tito as both a friend and a fellow maverick in the communist movement, is already angry. During the Middle East war the Yugoslavs attempted to pressure Romania into adopting a more pro-Arab stance. At the UN, the Yugoslavs were instrumental in dismissing Romania's offer of troops to the UNEF. The Yugoslav shift on the Sino-Soviet dispute will add to Ceausescu's anger.

In the long run, differences between Belgrade and Bucharest over the shared basic principles that have shaped their relations with Moscow could prove most damaging. Ceausescu is deeply worried over the possible growth of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. If he becomes unsure of Belgrade's support for his cocky independent stance, he may feel forced to revise his relationship with Belgrade and, perhaps, review his entire foreign policy.

Belgrade can also expect to hear from those Communist parties that have been active in opposing Moscow's attempts to dominate the movement. Certainly, Peking will register its displeasure, as will the Albanians and the Italian Communists. As the results of Kiev become known, differences that are normally aired only in private could well break into open polemics with the Yugoslavs.

Belgrade's generally good relations with Western Europe have not yet been affected, though some deterioration is possible. Tito will, however, be careful not to rock the boat, because he wants Yugoslavia to play a full role in European detente and because his country is heavily dependent on Western trade and credits.

Relations with Washington, which have already dipped to a new low, are evidently in for some more rough sledding. Tito's decision to side with the radicals in the nonaligned movement dictates that in his eyes the United States has become the ogre in international relations.

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Independence versus Collaboration

If there is any single factor that has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for those policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world force. In essence, he currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West.

There are limits on the degree to which he will cooperate with the Soviets, however. He will not, for example, permit any kind of formal ties that would even appear to undermine his independence. He will also avoid restrictive relationships with CEMA that would preclude Belgrade's continued--and lucrative--relationship with the Common Market.

At least for the foreseeable future, Tito will work more closely with Moscow, but within the framework of detente, and only so long as he believes the Kremlin's avowals that it is dedicated to the peaceful settlement of major European problems. Should Moscow undertake any action that seems to threaten detente, the Yugoslavs will immediately back-pedal toward neutralism or toward the West. Similarly, if Moscow becomes overly confident of its influence and begins to meddle in Yugoslav internal affairs, it will discover that the honeymoon with Tito was very short indeed.

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